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Abstract 
Since the fall of the USSR, the development of the integration process has become a 
foreign policy priority of the former Soviet territory. However, Moscow has failed to 
achieve this goal: no established structure could lead to significant integration. This 
research provides a historical review of the Eurasian economic integration. Employing 
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an analysis of the international agreements and treaties that were behind the activities of 
the Eurasian integration unions, we reveal the specific features of economic integration 
communities’ evolution in the post-Soviet territory within the period from the Soviet 
Union collapse to the present date and assess their true fails and gains. The findings 
reveal that the Eurasian integration appears to have evolved mostly “on paper” in the 
form of various documents but has had no practical implementation. Its development 
was characterized by permanent cycles, which member countries attempted to 
overcome, establishing new integration entities. However, their interest gradually faded, 
making EAEU feel like the last attempt to implement a Eurasian integration processes.  
 
Keywords: the Post-Soviet Space, Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), 
Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), Russian Foreign Policy. 
 
 
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, comprehensive cooperation 
with the former Soviet republics has invariably been the top priority of Russian 
foreign policy. One of the major objectives of the Moscow administration in the 
post-Soviet space has been the promotion of integration processes that are 
designed to unite the newly independent states that surround Russia as a result 
of the ruin of the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, after 30 years, Russia has not 
succeeded in establishing any structure that could integrate post-Soviet countries. 
Therefore, Russian diplomacy has proved to be unable to meet one of 
the key objectives of the territory under consideration. What are the reasons for 
this, and is Eurasian economic integration possible in the way it is viewed in 
Russia? We will try to answer to these issues in this article. 
The influence of the first ideological factor manifests itself in the 
conclusions that have been discussed by various experts. Thus, most Russian 
scholars magnify the significance of Eurasian integration,
1
 while their Western 
counterparts
2
 are sceptical about these achievements and are critical of them. 
                                               
1  Alexander Dynkin, Elena Telegina, and Gulnar Khalova, “Rol’ Yevraziyskogo 
Ekonomicheskogo Soyuza v Formirovanii Bol'shoy Yevrazii” [The Role of the Eurasian 
Economic Union in the Formation of Great Eurasia], Mirovaya Ekonomika i 
Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniya [World Economy and International Relations] LXII, no. 4 
(2018): 5-24, DOI: 10.20542/0131-2227-2018-62-4-5-24 (accessed 21 June 2018); 
Ekaterina Shlapeko and Svetlana Stepanova, “Velikiy Shelkovyy Put’ i Yevraziyskaya 
Integratsiya” [Great Silk Road and Eurasian Integration], Mirovaya Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnye 
Otnosheniya [World Eсonomy and International Relations] LXII, no. 1 (2018): 43-52, DOI: 
10.20542/0131-2227-2018-62-01-43-52 (http://doi.org/10.20542/0131 z-2227-2018-62-
01-43-52). 
2  Laure Delcour, “Between the Eastern Partnership and Eurasian Integration: Explaining 
Post-Soviet Countries’ Engagement in (Competing) Region-Building Projects,” Problems 
of Post-Communism LXII, no. 6 (2015): 316-327, DOI: 10.1080/10758216.2015.1057075 
(accessed 18 July 2018); Bruno S. Sergi, “Putin’s and Russian-led Eurasian Economic 
Union: a Hybrid Half-economics and Half-political ‘Janus Bifrons’,” Journal of Eurasian 
Studies IX, no. 1 (2018): 52-60, DOI: 10.1016/j.euras.2017.12.005 (accessed 14 May 
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The influence of a second, psychological, factor is evident in the fact that 
researchers build up their assumptions based on their own impressions and their 
colleagues’ statements, thereby missing a factual source base. Therefore, their 
works are overly emotional and often distort reality to some degree.
3
 It appears 
necessary to give an objective and unbiased assessment of the Eurasian 
economic integration unions that is free of any distortions. 
The hypothesis of this research is that Eurasian economic integration 
has no future. In order to prove or challenge this statement we will address, in 
what follows, the following research tasks. Firstly, we will try to identify the 
main stages in the history of Eurasian economic integration development; 
secondly we will give the characteristics of each stage, determining the 
achievements and failures of Russian diplomacy in establishing Eurasian 
economic integration unions; thirdly we will point out the strengths and 
weaknesses of the unions under Moscow’s patronage; and finally we will reveal 
the reasons behind the on-going failures in establishing Eurasian economic 
integration unions that are functioning in the economic sphere.  
Eurasian economic integration implies integration processes in the 
economic sphere only of the post-Soviet territory, not across the entirety of 
Eurasia. This approach results from the perception of Eurasian integration by 
Russian authorities, expert and scientific communities, and the public at large. 
                                                                                                                   
2018); Richard Sakwa, “How the Eurasian Elites Envisage the Role of the EEU in Global 
Perspective,” European Politics & Society, vol. XVII (2016): 4-22, DOI: 
10.1080/23745118.2016.1171038 (accessed 11 August 2018); Hanna Smith, “Statecraft 
and Post-imperial Attractiveness: Eurasian integration and Russia as a Great Power,” 
Problems of Post-Communism LXIII, no. 3 (2016): 171-182, DOI: 
10.1080/10758216.2016.1145063 (accessed 15 April 2018); Jeanne Wilson, “The 
Eurasian Economic Union and China’s Silk Road: Implications for the Russian-Chinese 
Relationship,” European Politics & Society XVII (2016): 113-132, DOI: 
10.1080/23745118.2016.1171288 (accessed 30 June 2018); Alena Vieira, “A Tale of Two 
Unions: Russia-Belarus Integration Experience and its Lessons for the Eurasian Economic 
Union,” Journal of Borderlands Studies 32, no. 1 (2017): 41-53, DOI: 
10.1080/08865655.2016.1211959 (accessed 20 September 2018); Anthony Rinna, 
“Yerevan’s Choice: Armenia and its Integration into the Eurasian Customs Union,” Iran 
& the Caucasus XVIII, no. 4 (2014): 395-404, DOI: 10.1163/1573384X-20140407 
(accessed 30 May 2018); David Lane, “Post-socialist Regions in the World System,” 
European Politics & Society XVII (2016): 46-66. 
3  Ruslan Dzarasov, “The Global Crisis and Its Impact on the Eurasian Economic Union,” 
European Politics & Society XVII (2016): 23-34, DOI: 10.1080/23745118.2016.1171272 
(accessed 1 June 2018); Sean Roberts, “The Eurasian Economic Union: The Geopolitics 
of Authoritarian Cooperation,” Eurasian Geography and Economics LVIII, no. 4 (2017): 
418-441, DOI: 10.1080/15387216.2017.1415763 (accessed 15 June 2018); Sean Roberts 
and Ulrike Ziemer, “Explaining the Pattern of Russian Authoritarian Diffusion in 
Armenia,” East European Politics XIV, no. 4 (2015): 21-42, DOI: 
10.1080/21599165.2018.1457525 (accessed 21 June 2018); Alexander Lukin, “Eurasian 
Integration and the Clash of Values,” Survival LVI, no. 3 (2014): 43-60, DOI: 
10.1080/00396338.2014.920144 (accessed 21 June 2018). 
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“Post-Soviet integration” and “integration processes on the post-Soviet space” 
were traditionally close in meaning, but were never synonymous concepts.  
 
 
Methodology and empirical data 
 
The methods used in the analysis include: an approach that evaluates the evolution 
of the idea of Eurasian economic integration and its applications providing a 
historical review ; a study of primary documents including international agreements 
and treaties behind the activities of the Eurasian integration unions; a statistical 
method, providing insight into economic activities of these unions; a historical 
approach, revealing common features and trends of Eurasian economic integration 
through accurate reconstruction of its real history; a comparative approach, enabling 
authors to make “vertical” and “horizontal” comparisons (in space and time); and 
an integrated view of the orientation and conclusions on the cyclic nature of 
European economic integration processes. 
The theoretical basis of the research in question is provided by the 
realist paradigm of the theory of international relations. This theory focuses on 
the key role of nation states in modern international relations and their certain, 
sometimes contradicting, interests. Eurasian economic integration processes are 
considered through the analysis of foreign policy and interests pursued by 
member states of the Eurasian integration unions.  
The primary data includes documents of the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS) – the Alma-Ata Protocol, agreements establishing the CIS 
and the Economic Union, the CIS Statute, Customs Union of 1995–2000s 
Agreements on the Customs Union between Russian Federation and the Republic 
of Belarus, Russian Federation and the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Treaties on 
Deepening the Integration in the Economic and Humanitarian Fields, on the 
Customs Union and the Common Economic Space, Eurasian Economic 
Community, Common Economic Space 2003–2005, the Eurasian Economic Union, 
as well as integration projects by Nursultan Nazarbayev and Vladimir Putin.
4
 
                                               
4  CIS, “Alma-Atinskaya Deklaratsiya” [Alma-Ata Protocol] signed on 21 December 1991, 
Sodruzhestvo: Informatsionnyy Vestnik Soveta Glav Gosudarstv i Soveta Glav Pravitel’stv 
SNG [The Commonwealth: CIS Council of Heads of State and Council of Heads of 
Government Information Bulletin] I (1992): 15-16; CIS, “Soglasheniye o Sozdanii 
Sodruzhestva Nezavisimykh Gosudarstv” [Agreement Establishing the Commonwealth of 
Independent States] signed on 8 December 1991, Sodruzhestvo: Informatsionnyy Vestnik 
Soveta Glav Gosudarstv i Soveta Glav Pravitel’stv SNG [The Commonwealth: CIS 
Council of Heads of State and Council of Heads of Government Information Bulletin] I 
(1992): 6-8; CIS, “Dogovor o Sozdanii Ekonomicheskogo Soyuza” [Agreement 
Establishing the Economic Union] (signed on 24 September 1993 Sodruzhestvo: 
Informatsionnyy Vestnik Soveta Glav Gosudarstv i Soveta Glav Pravitel’stv SNG [The 
Commonwealth: CIS Council of Heads of State and Council of Heads of Government 
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The Evolution of Eurasian Integration 
 
First steps on the way to Eurasian integration: ten years of 
missed opportunities 
 
Despite the widespread opinion that the CIS was established as an 
integration union to substitute the USSR and was targeted at uniting former 
Soviet republics, the reality testifies to the opposite. The CIS had never had any 
functional mechanisms at its disposal that were aimed at real integration of 
member countries. It is noteworthy that there is no such term as “integration” 
                                                                                                                   
Information Bulletin] I (1993): 20-30; CIS, “Ustav SNG” [The CIS Statute] signed on 22 
January 1993, Sodruzhestvo: Informatsionnyy Vestnik Soveta Glav Gosudarstv i Soveta 
Glav Pravitel’stv SNG [The Commonwealth: CIS Council of Heads of State and Council 
of Heads of Government Information Bulletin] I (1993): 17-29; EurAsEC, Agreement on 
the Customs Union between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus of 6 
January 1995, accessed November 05,2018, http://www.evrazes.com/docs/view/117; 
“Soglasheniye Stran SNG o Tamozhennom Soyze” [Agreement of the CIS Countries on 
the Customs Union] signed on 20 January 1995, Byulleten’ Mezhdunarodnykh Dogovorov 
[Bulletin of International Treaties] XVI (1995): 11-12; EurAsEC, Treaty between the 
Russian Federation, the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz 
Republic on Increased Integration in Economic and Humanitarian Fields of 29 March 
1996, accessed November 05, 2018, http://evrazes.com/docs/view/120; Eurasian Economic 
Commission, Agreement on the Customs Union and the Common Free Market Zone Dated 
February 26, 1999, accessed December05,2018,http://www.eurasiancommission.org/ 
en/act/trade/catr/nontariffPages/Dogovor_26021999.aspx; EurAsEC, “Protokol o 
Prisoedinenii Respubliki Uzbekistam k Dogovoru ob Uchrezhdenii Evraziyskogo 
Ekonomicheskogo Soobscchestva” [Protocol on the Accession of the Republic of 
Uzbekistan to the Treaty Establishing the Eurasian Economic Community] (signed on 25 
January 2006), Byulleten’ Mezhdunarodnykh Dogovorov [Bulletin of International 
Treaties] VI (2006): 5-6; EurAsEC, Dogovor ob Uchrezhdenii Yevraziyskogo 
Ekonomicheskogo Soobshchestva ot 10 Oktyabrya 2000 Goda [Treaty Establishing the 
Eurasian Economic Community signed on 10 October 2000],, accessed December 15, 
2018 http://www.evrazes.com/print/docs/3; President of Russia Official Website, 
Kontseptsiya Formirovaniya Yedinogo Ekonomicheskogo Prostranstva [Agreement and 
Concept establishing the Common Economic Space] signed on 19 September 2003, 
accessed December 14, 2018, http://kremlin.ru/supplement/1716; President of Russia 
Official Website, Kontseptsiya Formirovaniya Yedinogo Ekonomicheskogo Prostranstva 
[Agreement and Concept establishing the Common Economic Space] signed on 19 
September 2003, accessed December 14, 2018, http://kremlin.ru/supplement/1716; 
EAEU, “Treaty on the Eurasian Economic Union,” EAEU Law Portal, 29 May 2014, 
accessed March 05, 2018), https://docs.eaeunion.org/ docs/ru-ru/0043610/itia_05062014; 
Nursultan Nazarbayev, “O Sozdanii Yevraziyskogo Soyuza” [Draft Treaty Establishing 
the Eurasian Union of States], Kazakhstanskaja Pravda CXXXVI, no. June 7 (1994): 1-2; 
Vladimir Putin, “A New Integration Project for Eurasia: the Future Born Today,” Izvestija 
CLXXXIII, no. 4 October (2011): 1, accessed December 01, 2018, 
https://www.rusemb.org.uk/press/246; https://iz.ru/news/502761. 
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found in the first agreement establishing the CIS, which was signed on the 8
th
 of 
December 1991,
5
 known as the Belovezha Accords, or in the Alma-Ata Protocol 
of 21 December 1991.
6
 In the CIS Statutes, signed on the 22
nd
 of January 1993, 
“integration” is mentioned twice: as one of the CIS objectives (“comprehensive 
and balanced economic and social development of member states within the 
frameworks of common economic space, interstate cooperation and 
integration”) (art. 2), and as an operation guideline of the newly established 
organization (“development of mutually beneficial economic and technological 
cooperation, expanding integration processes”) (art. 3).7 However, the above-
mentioned points are specified lastly, for accounting for their low significance 
with member states; CIS coordinating authorities are not entitled to any 
functions that would facilitate integration within this union.  
In 1993, Russian authorities first considered reintegration of the post-
Soviet republics to lead them out of the severe economic crisis. At that moment, 
after introducing a new national currency, the CIS started to fall apart. As a 
result, on the 24
th
 of September 1993, leaders of eight out of the 11 CIS states 
(Armenia, Belorussia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldavia, Tadzhikistan, and 
Uzbekistan) signed the Treaty on the Establishment of the Economic Union, 
which should function parallel to the CIS, without being a member. Although 
evolution of integration processes between member states was not among the 
objectives of the new structure (art. 2), it was proclaimed as one of its 
fundamental principles (art. 4).
8
 Turkmenistan joined the Economic Union 
Treaty on December of the same year. Thereon, the development of the Union 
came to the end, since the member states failed to reach a consensus on working 
mechanisms of this community, set too contrasting tasks in foreign policy, and 
                                               
5  CIS, “Soglasheniye o Sozdanii Sodruzhestva Nezavisimykh Gosudarstv” [Agreement 
Establishing the Commonwealth of Independent States] signed on 8 December 1991, 
Sodruzhestvo: Informatsionnyy Vestnik Soveta Glav Gosudarstv i Soveta Glav Pravitel’stv 
SNG [The Commonwealth: CIS Council of Heads of State and Council of Heads of 
Government Information Bulletin] I (1992): 6-8. 
6  CIS, “Alma-Atinskaya Deklaratsiya” [Alma-Ata Protocol] signed on 21 December 1991, 
Sodruzhestvo: Informatsionnyy Vestnik Soveta Glav Gosudarstv i Soveta Glav Pravitel’stv 
SNG [The Commonwealth: CIS Council of Heads of State and Council of Heads of 
Government Information Bulletin] I (1992): 15-16. 
7  CIS, “Ustav SNG” [The CIS Statute] signed on 22 January 1993, Sodruzhestvo: 
Informatsionnyy Vestnik Soveta Glav Gosudarstv i Soveta Glav Pravitel’stv SNG [The 
Commonwealth: CIS Council of Heads of State and Council of Heads of Government 
Information Bulletin] I (1993): 17-29. 
8  CIS, “Dogovor o Sozdanii Ekonomicheskogo Soyuza” [Agreement Establishing the 
Economic Union] (signed on 24 September 1993 Sodruzhestvo: Informatsionnyy Vestnik 
Soveta Glav Gosudarstv i Soveta Glav Pravitel’stv SNG [The Commonwealth: CIS 
Council of Heads of State and Council of Heads of Government Information Bulletin] I 
(1993): 20-30.  
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feared excessive economic dependence on Russia, having partly lost their 
sovereignty.  
After the failure of the Economic Union project, which was initiated by 
Russian president Boris Yeltsin and Kazakh president Nursultan Nazarbayev, 
the latter developed his own system of proposals for the prompt modernization 
of the CIS. In March 1994, Nazarbayev came forward with the idea of 
transforming the CIS into a more integrated alliance—the Eurasian Economic 
Union (EAEU). In June 1994, he published the document titled Project on the 
Formation of the Eurasian Union of States.
9
 It stressed the idea of enriching the 
low-effectiveness of the CIS with a more powerful EAEU. The project 
highlighted the main objectives and principles of the new structure, as well as 
its structure and operating mechanisms. The priority missions that were 
assigned to it included comprehensive economic integration of member states 
and providing necessary conditions for their complex modernization. The 
EAEU was supposed to evolve into a state-like institution, with its own capital 
city, state symbols, and supranational bodies. 
Obviously, Nazarbayev’s proposal appeared topical enough and 
envisioned the transformation of the amorphous Commonwealth into a new 
regional organization that would be able to bring the relations between post-
Soviet republics to a new effective level. Given the fact that by mid-1994 about 
half of the CIS countries were still prone to enhancing their contacts with 
Moscow and not all the ties were broken  off, EAEU could turn into a viable 
alliance of states, including, besides Russia and Kazakhstan, such countries as 
Armenia, Belorussia, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and, probably, “hesitating” 
Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan.  
However, this failed to happen. Only two heads of states supported 
Nazarbayev’s initiative: Kyrgyzstan President Askar Akayev and Tajikistan’s 
President Emomali Rakhmon. Russian authorities did not give any response to 
this initiative, thereby implying “no” in diplomatic terms. Moscow was 
reluctant to declare it openly. Uzbekistan President Islam Karimov and 
Turkmen President Saparmurat Niyazov even accused their Kazakh counterpart 
of populism, having criticized the suggested project as being an attempt to unite 
post-Soviet republics in a forced, rather than gradual way. Thus, the project of 
an economically determined Eurasian Union did not concretize. 
Boris Yeltsin’ administration’s response to Nazarbayev’s proposal was 
an alternative project of the Customs Union on the post-Soviet territory. The 
organization was supposed to ensure the initial level of economic integration for 
member states. At the first stage, the Moscow administration negotiated only 
with Minsk, thereby demonstrating to Alma-Aty that it would not tolerate any 
                                               
9  Nursultan Nazarbayev, “O Sozdanii Yevraziyskogo Soyuza” [Draft Treaty Establishing 
the Eurasian Union of States], Kazakhstanskaja Pravda CXXXVI, no. June 7 (1994): 1-2. 
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breakthrough projects to be initiated by any country other than Russia itself. It 
is likely that Project Sapphir, which was successfully completed in November 
1994 under Kazakh authorities, was the reason behind this. About 600 kg of 
highly enriched uranium acquired by Kazakhstan after the Soviet Union break-
up was purchased by the USA in a highly confidential manner that was kept 
secret from Russia.  
At any rate, on the 6
th
 of January 1995, Russia and Belarus signed the 
Agreement on the Customs Union,
10
 aiming for a “Customs duo” – the first 
integration alliance with Moscow’s participation, functioning at a sub-regional 
level. Despite Yeltsin’s expectations, Nazarbayev did not show any resentment; 
on the contrary, on the 20
th
 of January 1995, he joined the Customs Union, 
having enlarged it to become the “triple union.”11 Thereon, Moscow authorized 
a gradual transition of the post-Soviet states to a “multi-speed integration”, 
wherein every country could independently determine optimal extent and 
spheres of interrelation with other states of the region, regardless of the Russian 
position. Moscow have previously strongly rejected this approach before, which 
would refuse financial assistance to the states, that were not actively 
participating in CIS activities 
The Customs Union was rapidly developing in 1995–1999, even in the 
face of the economic crisis that hit the former Soviet Union republics in 1998, 
and the Russian August default of the same year. In 1996, Kyrgyzstan joined 
the Customs Union, followed by Tajikistan in 1999. The governing bodies of 
the Union developed and signed dozens of agreements, stipulating integration 
processes to reach a higher level – the level of a common economic space. The 
most significant of the agreements include: The Treaty on Deepening 
Integration in the Economic and Humanitarian Sphere of 29 March 1996,
12
 and 
the Treaty on the Customs Union and the Common Economic Space of 26 
February 1999.
13
 
However, one insurmountable obstacle appeared before the union in 
question: it failed to provide practical implementation of the decisions taken, 
thus leaving the process of integration just at the level of intentions. While in 
the above-mentioned cases the responsibility for this was assigned to all post-
                                               
10  EurAsEC, Agreement on the Customs Union between the Russian Federation and the 
Republic of Belarus of 6 January 1995, accessed October 12, 2018, 
http://www.evrazes.com/docs/view/117. 
11  EurAsEC, Agreement on the Customs Union of 20 January 1995, accessed November 27, 
2018, http://evrazes.com/docs/view/118B. 
12  EurAsEC, Treaty between the Russian Federation, the Republic of Belarus, the Republic 
of Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic on Increased Integration in Economic and 
Humanitarian Fields of 29 March 1996, accessed December 13, 2018, 
http://evrazes.com/docs/view/120. 
13  EurAsEc, Treaty on the Customs Union and the Common Economic Space of 26 February 
1999, accessed November 27, 2018, http://www.evrazes.com/docs/view/128. 
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Soviet republics, often preventing Russia from realizing its plans, the Customs 
Union format suggested deepening integration only between the states, oriented 
to rapprochement with Moscow. Therefore, setbacks of this alliance were 
basically caused by the reluctance and inability of Russia to carry out its duties. 
As a result, with the Presidency of Vladimir Putin in 2000, the Customs Union 
and the Common Economic Space had failed to be established.  
 
 
The Eurasian Economic Community: only formal integration 
 
Putin advocated for the transformation of the Customs Union into the 
Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC) to draw the line under failures in 
Russian foreign policy under Boris Yeltsin’s presidency and make the 
cooperation of the “Customs five” more official. The Eurasian Economic 
Community was established on the 10
th
 of October 2000.
14
 Subsequently, the 
process of rapprochement between member states came to be called Eurasian, 
not post-Soviet integration, with the post-Soviet period of new independent 
states being considered as the decade of the 1990s. It is noteworthy that if 
Yeltsin denied the neo-Eurasian conception in many ways, because Nazarbayev 
was its active advocate, Putin, in contrast, felt free to openly support it, naming 
the Kazakh president as the author of many progressive ideas in this sphere. All 
this contributed to a more favourable climate for EurAsEC.  
In 2000–2005 EurAsEC showed progressive development with positive 
trends. In contrast to the preceding years, Russian authorities were committed to 
filling the Union with specific content. The number of decisions taken by its 
institution decreased, but their practical implementation grew considerably. 
EurAsEC members expanded trade relations (the turnover between Russia and 
Belorussia increased from 9.3 to 15.8 billion dollars, between Russia and 
Kazakhstan from 4.4 to 9.7 billion dollars, between Russia and Kyrgyzstan 
from 191 to 544 million dollars, and between Russia and Tajikistan from 239 to 
335 million dollars).
15
 A number of old economic relations were recovered and 
new ones were established, along with interregional cooperation. Labour 
mobility increased (Russian and Kazakh labour markets expanded recruitment 
from Belorussia, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan). In 2002, Ukraine and Moldova 
were granted observer status, while being very sceptical of any previous 
integration initiatives from Moscow.  
                                               
14  EurAsEC, Dogovor ob Uchrezhdenii Yevraziyskogo Ekonomicheskogo Soobshchestva ot 
10 Oktyabrya 2000 Goda [Treaty Establishing the Eurasian Economic Community signed 
on 10 October 2000], accessed November 27, 2018, http://www.evrazes.com/print/docs/3. 
15  Russian Federal State Statistics Service, Russia in Figures-2007: Statistical Handbook 
(Moscow: Rosstat, 2007), 461, accessed November 27, 2018. http://www.gks.ru/ 
bgd/regl/b07_12/Main.htm. 
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Nevertheless, breakthrough results of the community were far from 
being so, even during that time frame. First, a major turnover increase between 
EurAsEC was related to the recovery of Russia and its partners after the crisis, 
ruining their economies for the past decade. In addition, global hydrocarbon 
prices rocketed during that time, while their trading was crucial in the turnover 
between Russia, Belorussia, and Kazakhstan. Under these circumstances, 
neither could the range of traded goods be extended, nor could their trading 
balance be considerably improved.  
Second, the share of EurAsEC countries in the total turnover of each 
member state was unlikely to go up (as it was with Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan), 
and even went down at worst (e.g. Russia, Belorussia, and Kazakhstan). This 
was justified by the fact that most EurAsEC countries were rather more open to 
foreign markets than to their community partners (e.g., European Union states, 
Ukraine and China have traditionally been Russia’s major trading partners, 
while its trade with other countries was rather limited and one-sided). 
Third, the Russian government regarded EurAsEC as a transitional 
structure between the low-effective, pseudo-integrational communities of the 
1990s and “true” integration projects, such as the Common Economic Space, 
and Economic Union of Member States. Therefore, Moscow did not consider it 
necessary to develop EurAsEC.  
Fourth, Russian authorities hesitated about exactly which integration 
union of the post-Soviet territory was especially significant. For instance, in 
2003–2004, Russia spared many efforts in order to establish a new integration 
alliance with Ukraine – the Common Economic Space (CES).16 This aspiration 
was conditioned by the desire of Moscow authorities to preserve their influence 
on Ukraine, its major economic partner and the country carrying out the main 
transit of Russian hydrocarbons to Europe. In order to engage Kiev in the 
Eurasian integration processes, Russia agreed to extend the boundaries of 
EurAsEC. By this, it is implied that EurAsEC and CES have always comprised 
three key states—Russia, Belorussia, and Kazakhstan; Ukraine has not been an 
EurAsEC member, and Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have not been CES members. 
In the course of its development, the CES would duplicate some EurAsEC 
functions, and even contradict it on some issues. However, Moscow was not 
jeopardized by such perspectives. This fact, together with the enthusiasm of 
Putin’s administration in arranging the new alliance, showed to Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan that Russia does not consider them to be key partners and does not 
value their allied relations. 
                                               
16  President of Russia Official Website, Kontseptsiya Formirovaniya Yedinogo 
Ekonomicheskogo Prostranstva [Agreement and Concept establishing the Common 
Economic Space], signed on 19 September 2003, accessed November 27, 2018, 
http://kremlin.ru/supplement/1716. 
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Fifth, despite crucial changes in Russian diplomacy with the advent of 
Putin, Moscow could not escape accusations of “egoism” and “power 
supremacy” on the part of its partners.17 Such accusations often appeared to be 
well-grounded. For instance, foreign policy “deideologization”, as it was called 
in Russian diplomatic practice, implied Moscow’s attempts to get from its CIS 
partners (including those on EurAsEC) maximum advantages, political and 
economic concessions. Thus, Russian authorities refused to render economic 
and financial help to post-Soviet states, demanding that these states repay 
previous debts or transfer the ownership of their natural resources and industrial 
facilities of interest to Russian business. Economic pressure and even “trade 
wars” came into use by Russian diplomacy. In exchange for rendering economic 
preferences to its neighbours, Russia required unconditioned loyalty, and 
sometimes, even complete subordination to Russian interests.  
These tendencies were especially noticeable with Russia–Belarus 
relations: while in December 1999, the countries viewed themselves as closest 
allies and even signed the Treaty Establishing the Union State of Russia and 
Belarus, in 2002 Russia demanded total or partial renunciation of sovereignty 
on the part of Belarus by transferring it to the bodies of the Union; having 
received point-blank refusal, Russia increased prices on the delivered natural 
gas. This led to a full-scale conflict in Russia—Belarus relations. Unfortunately, 
those were not isolated cases, and we wonder how this scenario could develop 
between military and political allies, members of several integration structures 
(besides EurAsEC, Russia and Belarus cooperate within the frameworks of The 
Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)). Though the question is likely 
to be left unanswered, Moscow’s acts towards Minsk led to the insecurity of 
EurAsEC partners. They clearly realized that being a partner of Russia does not 
guarantee any political or economic dividends. Thereby, their interest in 
developing Eurasian integration declined even more.  
By all means, a rather high degree of dependence of EurAsEC members 
on Russia at that time did not allow them to refuse to participate in Eurasian 
integration processes. This view is justified by Uzbekistan joining EurAsEC by 
January 2006.
18
 It is noteworthy that since the Customs Union establishment, 
Tashkent gradually rejected participation in the work of this community, 
regarding it as a tool for strengthening Russian influence in Central Asia. 
                                               
17  “Uzbekistan ne Khochet v Yedinoye Ekonomicheskoye Prostranstvo” [Uzbekistan Not to 
Join the Common Economic Space] (Unauthored), Rosbalt Information Agency, 5 December  
2011, accessed December 11, 2018, http://www.rosbalt.ru/exussr/2011/12/05/920565.html. 
18  EurAsEC, “Protokol o Prisoedinenii Respubliki Uzbekistam k Dogovoru ob Uchrezhdenii 
Evraziyskogo Ekonomicheskogo Soobscchestva” [Protocol on the Accession of the 
Republic of Uzbekistan to the Treaty Establishing the Eurasian Economic Community] 
(signed on 25 January 2006), Byulleten’ Mezhdunarodnykh Dogovorov [Bulletin of 
International Treaties] VI (2006): 5-6. 
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However, after several disturbances, called “Andijan events,” in May 2005, in 
some regions of the Republic, Uzbekistan had no choice: Western countries’ 
calls for international investigation of the events, as well as sanctions imposed 
against Tashkent, threatened Uzbekistan with international isolation, and even 
overt extraneous interference in domestic affairs. This would have led to the 
collapse of Islam Kerimov’s authoritarian regime, and therefore Kerimov did 
not hesitate to bring his country under Russian protection.  
It is noteworthy that Uzbekistan joining EurAsEC had ambiguous 
effects on this alliance. On the one hand, the community (CIS) was joined by 
the key member of the Central Asian region, and its role in global policy 
considerably exceeded the scales of its territory and economy. Given traditional 
pragmatism of Tashkent’s foreign policy, its joining EurAsEC proved relative 
effectiveness of this structure.  
On the other hand, EurAsEC’s predecessor, the Customs Union, was 
initially established as the alliance of three most developed post-Soviet 
republics, sharing common views on the reforms carried out by them. With 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan joining the Union, its structure started to blur, though 
leading countries could correct the existing imbalances by rendering full-scale 
assistance to Bishkek and Dushanbe. Uzbekistan joining EurAsEC completely 
ruined the inner balance of EurAsEC, as it was one of the poorest post-Soviet 
states with a population of over 25 million people, and had preserved 
government regulation of the economy. Thus, the community came to be split 
into the “core” of economically developed Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, 
and the “periphery,” represented by Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, the 
latter making impossible the implementation of progressive projects within the 
whole community (establishing the full-fledged Customs Union and Common 
Economic Space). 
Additionally, many EurAsEC members (Russia and Belarus, 
Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan) had substantive claims to each other. 
As a result, in 2006 EurAsEC started to plunge into crisis.  
EurAsEC leaders had been searching for the ways out of this crisis for 
about a year. In October 2007, they declared their refusal to implement joint 
projects within the organization’s frameworks. As a result, the Customs Union 
was supposed to be established on the territory of three industrial republics—
Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, while other countries were only keen to 
participate in the project. Legally, this decision enabled Moscow, Minsk, and 
Astana to negotiate over the Customs Union formation based on EurAsEС 
without establishing a new international unit. However, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, 
and Uzbekistan fell out of the alliance’s activities, losing interest in it.  
In 2008–2009 EurAsEС faced some challenges that it failed to cope 
with. In August 2008, the organization did not express an official view on the 
Russian military operation against Georgia; during the Five-day War of 8–12 
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August, none of Russia’s EurAsEС partners rendered it either any military or 
diplomatic assistance. (Subsequently, Russia managed to receive approval of its 
actions on the part of Belarus and Kazakhstan, with considerable pressure 
exerted on Minsk beforehand). 
Then, at the end of 2008 and in early 2009, EurAsEС failed to 
adequately assess the scope of the global economic recession; as a result, no 
sensible measures were taken to assist member states with withstanding the 
looming storm. Under the crisis, almost all the joint projects within EurAsEС 
were suspended, and the organizations completely lost signs of being an 
integrated community.  
Uzbekistan, which had not ratified most of the EurAsEС agreements by 
that time, announced a suspension of its participation in the alliance. Among the 
reasons, it named duplication of CIS functions by EurAsEС, and fierce 
disagreements on the preliminary requirements that were connected with joining it. 
Meanwhile, the Customs Triplet, restored earlier, continued to carry out 
consultations on the formation of Customs Union and Common Economic 
Space based on EurAsEС. In November 2009, the presidents of Russia, Belarus, 
and Kazakhstan signed a package of agreements stipulating the introduction of a 
single customs tariff starting 1 January 2010, and the formation of common 
customs territory starting from 1 July 2010, to be fully implemented by 1 
January 2012.  
The process of establishing a Customs Union faced a number of 
obstacles on the way. Russia was most cautious, given that its market was 
systemically important in the new alliance. Kazakhstan went furthest in the 
implementation of the achieved agreements. Minsk associated perspectives of 
its participation to the Customs Union with general problems of Belarus–Russia 
relations, which were in deep decline. Nevertheless, the parties were able to 
meet the schedule of the Union formation, by introducing the new customs tariff 
in January 2010, and by forming a common customs territory in July 2010, 
introducing new legislation of the Common Economic Space in January 2012. 
Afterwards, the “Customs Triplet” went on to the next stage of Eurasian 
integration – the process of institutionalization of the Common Economic 
Space, scheduled for 1 January 2016.  
Meanwhile, the Customs Union, as well as its predecessors, existed 
only on paper. The reasons were as follows: a wide range of seizures and 
limitations within the parties, falling out of the Customs Union proceedings; 
national interests prevailing over the union interests, resulting in inconsistent 
economic policy; regular destructive government interference into the market 
economy, characteristic of all member countries; a relatively low level of 
economic development of member countries, preventing them from taking 
advantage of the benefits from economic integration; and substantive 
controversies between the member states in oil, gas, and agriculture spheres, 
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regularly causing failures in the Customs Union and Common Economic Space 
functioning. Moreover, Russian authorities declared their path towards 
transforming the economic “core” of the EurAsEС into a more integrated 
structure – the Eurasian Union, thus causing strong resistance from Belarus and 
Kazakhstan. Consequently, political and ideological factors began to exercise a 
rather negative effect on the Customs Union work, which is detailed below.  
 
 
The failure of The Eurasian Economic Union  
 
Vladimir Putin presented the Prime Minister of the Russian 
Government the Eurasian Union reform project on The 3rd of October 2011 
then.
19
 A formal reason was the forthcoming transition to a higher level of 
Eurasian integration (launching the Common Economic Space project with 
Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan), but in a broader context, it was one of the 
principal guidelines of his political programme, developed for his participation 
in presidential election campaign in March 2012.   
According to Vladimir Putin, the Eurasian Economic Union was to 
become an integration community that evolved from the Customs Union and the 
Common Economic Space. This union did not claim to be the “new Soviet 
Union”, nor did it confront other organizations in the post-Soviet space. The 
union’s objectives included enhancing economic and technological 
competitiveness of the member states and establishing a kind of geopolitical 
bridge between Europe and the Asia–Pacific region. The Eurasian Union was 
deemed to be a part of the common Big Europe, based on the universal 
integration principles and values of freedom, democracy, and market laws. The 
union was to develop gradually, without forcing Russian partners, and it was 
declared open for any countries concerned.
20
  
Putin’s project provoked a strong reaction within all the former USSR 
republics. The most detailed discussions took place in Russia and Kazakhstan, 
primarily at the expert community level. Other CIS leaders demonstrated 
restraint, apparently expecting specific steps from Moscow. Nevertheless, there 
were exceptions: the President of Uzbekistan, Islam Karimov, strictly stated that 
somewhere on the former USSR territory there are certain forces that are 
pursuing restoration of the former USSR empire, though in a new form.
21
 It was 
the first criticism addressed to Moscow since 2001.  
                                               
19  Putin, “A New Integration Project,” 1. 
20  Ibid. 
21  “Uzbekistan ne Khochet v Yedinoye Ekonomicheskoye Prostranstvo” [Uzbekistan Not to 
Join the Common Economic Space] (Unauthored), Rosbalt Information Agency, 5 
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In 2013–2014, major work on determining future Eurasian Union 
profiles took place. The idea of enhancing the integration processes of the 
“Customs Triplet” was not contested by the member states. Belarus’ and 
Kazakhstan’s leaders did not support the concept of a highly integrated alliance, 
as presented by Putin. The Russian president advocated for a political and 
economic alliance, uniting the most economically developed CIS republics and 
crediting them with extensive powers, which would in fact turn it into a state-
similar institution. Putin’s counterparts were not so enthusiastic about close 
rapprochement with Moscow, considering it as a potential threat to their 
sovereignty. Kazakhstan appeared to be most tough about that; on April 25, 
2013, Nazarbayev stated, “Russia is said to be assembling the Empire and 
building the new Soviet Union. It is absurd. I would like to state point-blank: 
Kazakhstan has gained independence for the first time in its history… and we 
are not going to give it away to anyone. In case any communities infringe on the 
sovereignty of our country, our Constitution, we will be prompt to leave this 
organization”.22 Belarus authorities kept silent, de facto demonstrating their 
support to Astana’s position. As a result, Russia had to face a coordinated 
opposition of both partners, but it had to address concerns separately with each 
of them. Under these circumstances, exercising any pressure on Astana and 
Minsk seemed both pointless and dangerous, jeopardizing allied relations 
between Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, and destroying integration 
communities on the post-Soviet territory, giving up the very idea of establishing 
a Eurasian Union. In 2014, Moscow authorities could no longer exercise any 
impact on their partners, due to the events in Ukraine.  
It should be noted that the Ukrainian Crisis and the Crimean Spring are 
still insufficiently explored, and their analyses are usually politicized and 
strongly depend on the parties making judgements. Leaving alone ideology 
issues, it is clear that Belarus and Kazakhstan were particularly sensitive to 
Moscow’s policies towards Kiev and the loss of Crimea by Ukraine. Though the 
Lukashenko and Nazarbayev regimes had nothing to do with the forces having 
taken office in Ukraine, they were quite baffled by the overthrow of Viktor 
Yanukovich, and Moscow’s interference in domestic affairs of its neighbour 
reinforced their innate fear of Russia. Obviously, they associated their countries 
with Ukraine. Many Russians lived in Belarus and Kazakhstan, and it appeared 
that renouncing territorial claims by Russia could be unilaterally revised. We 
                                                                                                                   
December  2011, accessed December 11, 2018, http://www.rosbalt.ru/exussr/ 
2011/12/05/920565.html. 
22  Nursultan Nazarbayev, “Nazarbayev: Kazakhstan Vyydet iz Lyubogo Soyuza v Sluchaye 
Ushchemleniya Nezavisimosti” [Kazakhstan to Withdraw from any union in case of 
infringement of independence: an interview], Tengri News Information Agency, 25 April 
2013, accessed November 27, 2018, https://tengrinews.kz/kazakhstan_news/nazarbaev-
kazahstan-vyiydet-lyubogo-soyuza-sluchae-232988/. 
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suppose the outcome with Ukraine was exceptional, and we definitely do not predict 
the same for other countries, but in spring 2014, Belarus and Kazakhstan clearly came 
out with their resistance to develop their integration relations with Moscow. 
International tensions caused by the revolution upheavals in Ukraine 
also strongly affected the positions of Minsk and Astana. The parties clearly 
understood that the new political alliance with Moscow would drag them into 
opposition with Western countries, which were already aggravated by Crimea 
joining Russia. Such perspectives were an unwanted change, since it would 
have deprived them of the opportunity to pursue a multi-vector foreign policy. 
Against this background, rumours started to spread about another wave 
of imminent economic crisis (the first wave overwhelmed the Russian economy 
in 2009–2010). It could arouse major problems for all the participants to the 
Customs Triplet, questioning the worth of even forming an economic union 
with Moscow. Therefore, Putin’s integration project perspectives started to fade.  
Kazakhstan reinforced its diplomatic pressure on Moscow, launching 
the discussion of the Eurasian integration principles in the mass media. Before 
signing the Eurasian Economic Union Agreement, Kazakhstan’s foreign 
ministry first issued a statement on the future document’s content. It underlined 
that due to the position of Astana, the future union will be purely an economic 
one, excluding from its scope issues of citizenship, foreign policy, inter-
parliamentary cooperation, passport and visa service, and common border 
security.
23
 The above, therefore, implied that Russia made serious concessions 
to Kazakhstan and Belarus and gave up on its former views of the essence of the 
alliance in question.  
On May the 29
th
, 2014, the Treaty on the Eurasian Economic Union 
(EAEU) was signed by the leaders of Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan in 
Astana.
24
 According to it, EAEU integration should not go beyond the 
frameworks of the trade and economic sphere, and political cooperation of 
member states should only serve the economic objectives of the community.  
Officially, the parties estimated highly the conclusion of an agreement, 
stressing their satisfaction with the work and stating its significance and fruitful 
perspectives for economic development and improved well-being of the 
population. Enthusiasm on the part of Putin, Lukashenko, and Nazarbayev, as 
demonstrated to TV cameras, seemed rather exaggerated, since no progress had 
been made in Eurasian integration, and the pattern of member countries, 
stipulated by the EAEU Treaty, had little difference from the patterns of the 
Customs Union of 1995–2000 and EurAsEC. Putin’s proposal, expressed in 
                                               
23  “EAES ne Ushchemit Natsional’nyye Interesy Kazakhstana” [EAEU Not to Harm 
Kazakhstan’s National Interests], Kazinform International News Agency, 26 May 2014, 
accessed November 27, 2018, https://www.inform.kz/rus/article/2661754. 
24  Dogovor o Yevraziyskom Ekonomicheskom Soyuze [Treaty on the Eurasian Economic 
Union], Astana, 29 May 2014, accessed November 27, 2018, http://base.garant.ru/70670880/. 
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October 2011,
25
 was realized in a distorted way, and a large-scale, highly 
integrated Eurasian Union of Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan was replaced by 
its reduced variant.  
Until the formal launch of the EAEU, which was scheduled for the 1
st
 
of January 2015, Eurasian economic integration was so heavily challenged that 
prospects of its further implementation were nearly jeopardized.  
The major challenge was the imposing of mutual sanctions by Moscow 
and Western countries in August 2014, resulting in a negative impact on the 
economy of Russia. Partners of Moscow in the Customs Union escaped any 
pressure and had no reasons to reject interaction. This engendered a split of the 
Customs Union and restoration of barriers within it. Although Moscow 
considered these measures as necessary ones (otherwise the announced 
sanctions against Western countries would not be implemented), Astana and 
Minsk did not perceive them adequately. For instance, Belarus was able to 
provide supplies of the “banned” goods, imported from Western Europe; as a 
result, trout, salmon, and Belarusian seafood flooded Russia, despite Belarus 
being a landlocked country that has no basins for fish farming. Russian 
customers responded by restricting large cargo transmission through the 
Russia–Belarus border. As a result, in November 2014, the “trade war” was 
actually unleashed between the states.  
Rouble denomination aggravated the situation, making Belarusian and 
Kazakh goods less profitable compared to Russian ones. Kazakhstan responded 
by developing measures to restrict Russian imports of certain agricultural 
products, automobiles, and construction materials. A new wave of economic 
crisis was triggered in Belarus and Kazakhstan due to its distinct economic 
independence from Russia, destabilizing both republics.  
A conundrum had emerged in the still-forming Eurasian Economic Union by 
the end of 2014: instead of mutual support, the member states took pains to put 
spokes in each other’s wheels, harming each other. Subsequently, Russia started to 
lose its position in the post-Soviet territory and worldwide—so much so that Belarus 
and Kazakhstan were even able to block Russian initiatives. 
All the above-mentioned forced Russia to advocate the expansion of 
EAEU by joining Armenia and Kyrgyzstan in order to strengthen Russian 
positions in the community. This approach absolutely contradicted initial views 
of the Russian authorities, who planned for gradual expansion of the union as 
states became ready to join the EAEU. In addition, this approach defied the 
logic of forming EAEU, suggesting integration of the most powerful economies 
on the post-Soviet territory. Thus, the EAEU repeated its predecessors’ 
mistakes, expanding its frameworks without any prerequisites. 
                                               
25  Putin, “A New Integration Project,” 1. 
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It is noteworthy that its partners did not object to the Russian position, and 
as early as the 2
nd
 of January 2015, Armenia joined the EAEU, and Kyrgyzstan 
followed in August 2015. Syrian leaders announced their intention to join the 
community, arousing mixed reactions within the Russian mass media. 
Meanwhile, negative tendencies grew within the EAEU in contrast to 
the flashy statements of its leaders about significant success of the alliance. The 
economic crisis in Russia came to have a long recession, and its turnover with 
EAEU partners impressively declined. Fall of global hydrocarbon prices 
disrupted the Kazakhstan economy, making its recovery very unlikely to happen 
anytime soon.  
A new irritant of Russia–Kazakhstan relations appeared at the end of 
2015. Following the 24
th
 of November, when Turkish Air Forces shot down the 
Russian Sukhoi Su-24M warplane, conducting a military campaign in Syria, 
any contacts between Moscow and Ankara were completely frozen, and the 
countries found themselves on the brink of a conflict. For Kazakhstan, which 
had always viewed Turkey as a major partner and an ethnically, religiously, and 
culturally close state, the situation was rather painful. From then on, Astana had 
to balance relations both between Moscow and Western countries, and between 
Moscow and Ankara. Analogously with the Ukraine crisis, Russia did not 
coordinate its steps with Kazakhstan leaders and did not foresee the 
consequences of those steps for their partner. Obviously, it was a violation of 
the cooperation rules between the two states, and Moscow again proved itself as 
an unreliable partner for Astana.  
The Kazakhstan government was very careful at first, offering itself as a 
mediator in settling relations between Turkey and Russia. However, Moscow 
neglected this offer, demanding official apologies, prosecution of the 
perpetrators, and damage compensation from Turkey. Astana started to run out 
of patience and on the 21
st
 of December 2015, on the anniversary of CIS, 
Nazarbayev unequivocally stated that Moscow got entangled in disagreements 
with Western countries, in the Ukraine conflict, in the Syria military campaign, 
and in confrontation with Turkey. He proposed to Putin that they discuss “how 
to develop the Eurasian Union, when Transatlantic and Trans-Pacific 
partnerships are being established.”26 In diplomatic terms this meant that if 
Russia would not address contradictions with Turkey, thereby ensuring the 
EAEU would remain community on paper, then Kazakhstan would be 
compelled to withdraw from the integration project, making its way by 
developing relations with the USA, EU countries, and China.  
                                               
26  President of Russia Official Website, Meeting with President of Kazakhstan Nursultan 
Nazarbayev, 21 December 2015, accessed November 27, 2018, http://en. 
kremlin.ru/events/president/news/50982. 
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Only in June 2016, when the Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan 
officially apologized for shooting down the Russian warplane, were relations 
between Russia and Ankara re-established. This was to reduce tensions in the 
Russia–Kazakhstan relations, and revive cooperation within the EAEU 
frameworks. However, it never actually happened, since over the period of 
sanctions, Kazakhstan, together with other EAEU partners, reduced interaction 
with Moscow and replaced it with other partners. 
Russian authorities clearly realized both these tendencies and that 
EAEU integration potential in its original form had been exhausted. Therefore, 
Moscow intensified its efforts in joining other participants. Consequently, in 
2015–2017, Cambodia, Chile, China, Hungary, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Israel, 
Japan, Laos, Mongolia, Pakistan, Peru, Singapore, South Korea, Serbia, and 
Tunis showed their interest in establishing relations with the EAEU. Russia 
launched negotiations on introducing the free trade zone between the EAEU and 
Thailand, Vietnam, and Iran (with Iran willing to join the community as a full 
member). The leaders of the community viewed intensification of the foreign 
relations as one of its most significant achievements, but the authors of this 
article doubt it. It should be noted that free trade zones between EAEU, the 
Middle East, and Far East countries complied neither with EAEU regional 
specifics, nor with its principles, as stipulated by the EAEU Statutes. This 
significant increase in the number of external partners resulted in the blurring of 
the EAEU mandates, and member states focused not on strengthening mutual 
cooperation, but on the relations with non-member countries. Under mutual 
sanctions of Russia and Western countries, economic disagreements between 
Moscow and its EAEU partners grew to be chronic, bringing the mechanisms of 
the Customs Union and Common Economic Space to failure.  
In addition, the EAEU faced the problem of technological 
underdevelopment of the member states, threatening to turn this community into 
one which would facilitate rapprochement of the parties on the production and 
export of hydrocarbons, minerals, and agricultural products. Back in 2009–2010 
the leaders of Belarus and Kazakhstan realized that it was unprofitable to 
purchase Western technologies from Russia, although it was customary before. 
As for Moscow, it found itself completely cut off from a number of Western 
technologies, due to the sanctions.  
A reduction of contact between Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan in the 
sphere of science and education was the direct consequence of this situation. 
Since 2015–2016 the number of Belarusian and Kazakh students, magistrates 
and postgraduates in Russian universities has considerably dropped; instead, 
Belarusian and Kazakh young people headed for Western education 
establishments. The Russian language ceased to be the “window to the world”, 
and on the 26
th
 of October 2017, Nazarbayev signed a decree about switching 
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from the Cyrillic to the Latin alphabet. Though Latin script in Kazakhstan was 
far from the Turkish one, the decision itself signified Astana drifting towards Ankara. 
Changes in the attitudes of the Russian authorities to the EAEU were 
represented in a reduction of the number of conferences and publications on 
Eurasia, and its coverage was one-sided—Eurasian integration seemed to escape 
the scope of Russian priorities. During the presidential election campaign of 
2018 in Russia, none of the candidates presented deepening the Eurasian 
economic integration as one of their priorities (precisely nobody even 
mentioned it). All the above justifies the claim that Moscow became absolutely 
disappointed with participation in EAEU, questioning viability of the 
community in the foreseeable future.  
 
 
Conclusions 
 
As we described above, the initial hypothesis was confirmed: all the Eurasian 
economic integration projects, implemented under Russian leadership since the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, turned to be either unsustainable, or existed only 
“on paper”, without any practical implementation of their decisions. The 
relevant conclusions were made based on the comparison of the goals and 
principles of these alliances, as they are indicated in their Statutes, and an 
analysis of their actual results.  
Russian experts, considering integration processes of the “post-Soviet 
Eurasia” to be the least effective in the 1990s, are likely to be right. It was a 
trial-and-error period, rather than one of pursuing definite results. Later on, the 
groupings, which were established around Moscow, were not very fruitful in 
their activities. This tendency was particularly apparent in connection with 
political controversies growing between Russia and the West, and crisis 
tendencies subsequently rooted in the Russian economy. Despite being actively 
advocated in Russia that the Eurasian Economic Union was the climax of post-
Soviet integration processes, we have to invalidate this conclusion. On the 
contrary, disintegration processes took place, leading the member states to a 
state of integration deadlock.  
The practical value of the conclusions obtained in the course of this 
research consists of two major aspects. Firstly, the conclusions can help EAEU 
participants to reassess their foreign policy intentions and to clearly realize 
whether these joint integration initiatives comply with their own interests. 
Kazakhstan’s authorities seem to have started doing so, distancing themselves 
from Russia and decisively approaching China and Western countries. 
Uncertainty grows among EAEU countries, and in Russia too, aggravating the 
stagnation of this community. Secondly, countries concerned with further 
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implementation of the Eurasian integration projects should work out new 
principles, schedules, and mechanisms to protect their alliances from repeating 
crises. If the Eurasian economic integration continues to stick to its past 
approach to these agreements, its future is likely to be rather lamentable.  
Over the three decades after the USSR breakdown, Eurasian economic 
integration has remained a project only on paper and an unrealistic illusion of 
the leaders who came up with the relevant initiatives and shaped the various 
integration structures.The development of the Eurasian economic integration 
was not linear, since its stages failed to logically follow one another. In contrast, 
it was of a cyclical nature, which could be represented as a sequence of 
repeating events. In the first place, it registetered the theoretical reflection of the 
objectives and tasks the Eurasian integration is facing, and the justification of 
the need for its development. In the second place, this saw working out new 
principles, mechanisms of cooperation, and its institutional bases. Thirdly this 
meant establishing new integration alliances and fourthly expanding and 
deepening cooperation in the new communities mainly “on paper”, with a low 
level of practical implementation of the agreements between the member 
countries. In the fifth place, it included extending the number of participants and 
in the sixth place an inability of the integration communities to adapt to the new 
extended framework and an increase of crises tendencies. Finally, it meant 
rethinking the objectives and tasks of the Eurasian integration.  
The elimination of some integration structures and establishment of 
others had both positive and negative consequences. The advantages include the 
invaluable experience that member countries received at every new stage of the 
Eurasian economic development, and they came to realize more clearly their 
interests and real opportunities under the implementation of various joint 
initiatives. The main disadvantage was the growing disappointment of the 
parties with their inability to develop full-scale interaction with each other. The 
last point proves to be the most significant one: in the course of time, both the 
political elite and publicity of the former Soviet republics became convinced 
that implementation of integration projects on the post-Soviet territory was 
unlikely, and even impossible. One also has to take into account that the parties 
did not hesitate to blame their nearest neighbours, former USSR republics, in all 
their failures. Russia would blame former USSR republics, and the latter in their 
turn would blame Russia. Mutual distrust grew between the countries, and they 
strived to replace their key foreign partners. 
By now, the cyclical development of the Eurasian economic integration 
has exhausted itself: a new generation of citizens have come to grow up in the 
post-Soviet states, no longer viewing the world through the prism of common 
historical heritage. They are unlikely to be interested in their countries’ 
participation in Eurasian integration projects. Accordingly, integration 
initiatives will no longer be relevant, due to the change of power in post-Soviet 
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republics, which had already happened in some places (Georgia, Moldova, 
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Ukraine), and is sure to happen in others. Thus, 
integration projects are deprived of the long-term perspective. 
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